AgentDojo
In plain wordsA testing environment that measures how easily AI assistants that use email, calendars or banking tools can be hijacked by hidden instructions planted in the content they read.
An extensible benchmarkbenchmark, n.: A fixed, shared test — a set of questions or tasks with an agreed way of scoring — used to compare AI systems with one another and to track progress over time. and test harness measuring how well AI agentsAI agent, n.: An AI system that does not just answer but acts: given a goal, it decides on steps, uses tools such as a browser or code editor, checks the results and keeps going until the job is done. resist indirect prompt injectionindirect prompt injection, n.: A prompt-injection attack in which the trick instructions are hidden in content the AI reads on its own — a web page, an email, a file — rather than typed by the person using it. when the tools they call return content that an attacker may control. It supplies simulated environments — a workspace with email, calendar and cloud files, a Slack-style messaging workspace, travel booking and e-banking — with realistic user tasks and attacker goals; the original release had 97 user tasks and 629 security test cases. Injected instructions are placed in tooltool call, n.: A single request from an AI model to use one of its tools — naming the tool and filling in the details — which the surrounding software then carries out and reports back on. outputs such as emails, reviews or web pages, and the framework measures both utility (whether the agent completes the user's task) and attack success (whether it carries out the attacker's goal), with and without defenses such as prompt sandwiching, injection detectors and tool filtering. Because success is checked by inspecting the environment's state rather than the agent's text, new tasks, attacks and defenses are easy to add. It became a standard testbed for agent hijacking, used by the US AI Safety Institute and in industry and academic research on defenses.
The new injection detector cut AgentDojo attack success to 3%, but utility dropped eight points.
Origin
Introduced by Edoardo Debenedetti, Jie Zhang, Mislav Balunović, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Marc Fischer and Florian Tramèr of ETH Zurich and Invariant Labs in 'AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents' (June 2024; NeurIPS 2024 Datasets and Benchmarks track).
Usage note
The US AI Safety Institute (now CAISICenter for AI Standards and Innovation, prop. n.: The US government's AI testing and standards center, part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. It evaluates advanced AI models, American and foreign, for national-security risks and works with companies on voluntary testing.) used and extended AgentDojo in its early-2025 work on agent hijacking evaluations.
Related
- indirect prompt injectionindirect prompt injection, n.: A prompt-injection attack in which the trick instructions are hidden in content the AI reads on its own — a web page, an email, a file — rather than typed by the person using it.
- prompt injectionprompt injection, n.: Tricking an AI system by slipping in text that it mistakes for instructions — for example, a hidden line in an email telling an AI assistant to forward the user's messages to a stranger.
- AI agentAI agent, n.: An AI system that does not just answer but acts: given a goal, it decides on steps, uses tools such as a browser or code editor, checks the results and keeps going until the job is done.
- tool usetool use, n.: An AI model's ability to reach beyond its own knowledge by operating outside tools — searching the web, running code, using a calculator or an app — and folding the results into its work.
- attack success rateattack success rate, n.: The share of attempts in which an attack works — for example, the percentage of forbidden requests a model ends up answering when it is attacked.
- red teamingred teaming, n.: Deliberately attacking your own AI system — trying to make it misbehave, leak secrets or help with harm — so that weaknesses are found before real adversaries or users find them.
Sources
- Debenedetti, E., Zhang, J., Balunović, M., Beurer-Kellner, L., Fischer, M. & Tramèr, F. (2024). AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents. NeurIPS 2024 Datasets and Benchmarks Track. arXiv:2406.13352. arxiv.org/abs/2406.13352