intentionality
In plain wordsThe way thoughts, beliefs and desires are about things: a belief is about rain, a wish is for cake. Philosophers ask whether a machine's internal states can be about anything.
The aboutness of the mind: the feature by which a mental state is directed at something beyond itself — an object, a property, a situation, even something nonexistent such as a unicorn — and which words, pictures and other representations have in a derived way. Beliefs, desires, intentions and perceptions have it; whether pains and moods do is debated. Franz Brentano proposed intentionality as the mark of the mental. John Searle distinguished intrinsic (often called original) intentionality, which minds have, from derived intentionality, which words and computer states have only because people interpret them, and argued that programs alone yield only the derived kind. Whether the representations inside language modelslarge language model, n.: A computer program trained on enormous amounts of text to predict the words that come next. At vast scale, that simple skill lets it chat, answer questions, translate, summarize and write code. have original intentionality — whether a model's 'belief' is really about anything — is a live question in debates over machine understandingmachine understanding, n.: Whether, and in what sense, an AI system grasps what words, situations or problems mean — rather than just producing answers that look as though it does..
Origin
From the medieval scholastic term intentio, revived by Franz Brentano in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), who described mental acts as directed upon an object. John Searle's Intentionality (1983) and Daniel Dennett's work on the intentional stanceintentional stance, n.: Predicting what something will do by treating it as if it had beliefs and goals — as we do with people, and often with chess programs and chatbots — whatever is really going on inside. shaped its use in debates about AI.
Usage note
Not the everyday sense of doing something intentionally, on purpose: in philosophy any state that is about something has intentionality, whether or not it involves an intention.
Related
- intentional stanceintentional stance, n.: Predicting what something will do by treating it as if it had beliefs and goals — as we do with people, and often with chess programs and chatbots — whatever is really going on inside.
- symbol grounding problemsymbol grounding problem, n.: The puzzle of how words or symbols inside a machine can mean anything by themselves, rather than only pointing to more symbols — like a dictionary that defines every word using other words.
- Chinese roomChinese room, n.: A thought experiment: a person who knows no Chinese follows a rulebook to answer Chinese messages so well that outsiders think they understand. If the person doesn't understand, does a computer running a program?
- machine understandingmachine understanding, n.: Whether, and in what sense, an AI system grasps what words, situations or problems mean — rather than just producing answers that look as though it does.
- language of thought hypothesislanguage of thought hypothesis, n.: The theory that we think in an inner, wordless mental language with its own symbols and grammar, which the brain manipulates when we reason, much as a computer manipulates code.
- consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question.
Sources
- Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint). Duncker & Humblot.
- Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Mentioned in
Chinese roomChinese room, n.: A thought experiment: a person who knows no Chinese follows a rulebook to answer Chinese messages so well that outsiders think they understand. If the person doesn't understand, does a computer running a program?, intentional stanceintentional stance, n.: Predicting what something will do by treating it as if it had beliefs and goals — as we do with people, and often with chess programs and chatbots — whatever is really going on inside., John SearleJohn Searle, prop. n.: An American philosopher who devised the Chinese room argument, which holds that a computer running a program can manipulate symbols without understanding anything., machine understandingmachine understanding, n.: Whether, and in what sense, an AI system grasps what words, situations or problems mean — rather than just producing answers that look as though it does., philosophy of artificial intelligencephilosophy of artificial intelligence, n.: The branch of philosophy that asks what AI is and could be: whether machines can think, understand or be conscious, what intelligence is, and what we owe to and should expect from intelligent machines., symbol grounding problemsymbol grounding problem, n.: The puzzle of how words or symbols inside a machine can mean anything by themselves, rather than only pointing to more symbols — like a dictionary that defines every word using other words., folk psychologyfolk psychology, n.: The everyday way people explain and predict each other's actions in terms of beliefs, desires and intentions, as in 'she took an umbrella because she thought it would rain'., language of thought hypothesislanguage of thought hypothesis, n.: The theory that we think in an inner, wordless mental language with its own symbols and grammar, which the brain manipulates when we reason, much as a computer manipulates code.