John Searle
In plain wordsAn American philosopher who devised the Chinese room argument, which holds that a computer running a program can manipulate symbols without understanding anything.
American philosopher whose Chinese roomChinese room, n.: A thought experiment: a person who knows no Chinese follows a rulebook to answer Chinese messages so well that outsiders think they understand. If the person doesn't understand, does a computer running a program? thought experiment, set out in 'Minds, Brains, and Programs' (1980), is the classic argument that a computer cannot understand anything merely by running the right program. A person who answers questions in Chinese by following a rule book, without knowing Chinese, stands in for the computer: the replies may be flawless, yet the symbols mean nothing to the one manipulating them, because syntax alone does not produce meaning. The same paper drew the distinction between strong AIstrong AI, n.: Originally, the claim that a computer running the right program would literally have a mind and understand, not just imitate understanding. Today it often simply means AI as capable as humans across the board., the claim that a suitably programmed computer literally has a mind, and weak AI, its use as a tool for studying the mind. Searle taught at the University of California, Berkeley, from 1959 and was already known for his theory of speech acts. His positive view, biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind., holds that consciousness and intentionalityintentionality, n.: The way thoughts, beliefs and desires are about things: a belief is about rain, a wish is for cake. Philosophers ask whether a machine's internal states can be about anything. are biological phenomena caused by specific brain processes. The argument remains among the most debated in philosophy of mind and resurfaced in arguments over machine understandingmachine understanding, n.: Whether, and in what sense, an AI system grasps what words, situations or problems mean — rather than just producing answers that look as though it does. in large language modelslarge language model, n.: A computer program trained on enormous amounts of text to predict the words that come next. At vast scale, that simple skill lets it chat, answer questions, translate, summarize and write code..
Related
- Chinese roomChinese room, n.: A thought experiment: a person who knows no Chinese follows a rulebook to answer Chinese messages so well that outsiders think they understand. If the person doesn't understand, does a computer running a program?
- strong AIstrong AI, n.: Originally, the claim that a computer running the right program would literally have a mind and understand, not just imitate understanding. Today it often simply means AI as capable as humans across the board.
- biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind.
- intentionalityintentionality, n.: The way thoughts, beliefs and desires are about things: a belief is about rain, a wish is for cake. Philosophers ask whether a machine's internal states can be about anything.
- symbol grounding problemsymbol grounding problem, n.: The puzzle of how words or symbols inside a machine can mean anything by themselves, rather than only pointing to more symbols — like a dictionary that defines every word using other words.
- machine understandingmachine understanding, n.: Whether, and in what sense, an AI system grasps what words, situations or problems mean — rather than just producing answers that look as though it does.
- Hubert DreyfusHubert Dreyfus, prop. n.: An American philosopher who argued from the 1960s that computers following explicit rules could never match human intelligence, which rests on bodily, intuitive know-how.
Sources
- Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3): 417–457.
Mentioned in
Chinese roomChinese room, n.: A thought experiment: a person who knows no Chinese follows a rulebook to answer Chinese messages so well that outsiders think they understand. If the person doesn't understand, does a computer running a program?, Hubert DreyfusHubert Dreyfus, prop. n.: An American philosopher who argued from the 1960s that computers following explicit rules could never match human intelligence, which rests on bodily, intuitive know-how.