biological naturalism
In plain wordsJohn Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind.
The position, defended by John Searle, that consciousness is an ordinary biological phenomenon: particular neurobiological processes produce it, and it exists as a property of the brain at a higher level of organization, much as liquidity is a property of water molecules taken together. It rejects both dualism and the identification of mind with computation: since programs are defined purely by formal symbol manipulation, implementing one is never by itself sufficient for a mind, though an artificial system that duplicated the brain's relevant causal powers could be conscious. Later biologically grounded views, such as the neuroscientist Anil Seth's, argue that consciousness may depend on features of living systems — metabolism, self-maintenance, predictive regulation of the body — that digital computers lack, which would make machine consciousnessmachine consciousness, n.: Whether a machine such as an AI system could have genuine experiences of its own — and the research field that tries to find out, or to build such a machine. unlikely in current AI.
Origin
John Searle's own label for his account of the mind–body problemmind–body problem, n.: The age-old question of how the mind — thoughts, feelings, experiences — relates to the physical body and brain. Is the mind simply what the brain does, or something more?, whose core claim, that brains cause minds by their specific causal powers, he stated with the Chinese roomChinese room, n.: A thought experiment: a person who knows no Chinese follows a rulebook to answer Chinese messages so well that outsiders think they understand. If the person doesn't understand, does a computer running a program? argument in 1980. He developed it in Intentionality (1983) and Minds, Brains and Science (1984) and set it out at length in The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992); when the label itself first appeared is not established.
Usage note
Not the claim that only carbon-based life can be conscious: Searle allows artificial consciousness in principle, provided the brain's causal powers are duplicated rather than merely simulated, as a simulated storm leaves no one wet.
Related
- Chinese roomChinese room, n.: A thought experiment: a person who knows no Chinese follows a rulebook to answer Chinese messages so well that outsiders think they understand. If the person doesn't understand, does a computer running a program?
- strong AIstrong AI, n.: Originally, the claim that a computer running the right program would literally have a mind and understand, not just imitate understanding. Today it often simply means AI as capable as humans across the board.
- machine consciousnessmachine consciousness, n.: Whether a machine such as an AI system could have genuine experiences of its own — and the research field that tries to find out, or to build such a machine.
- functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior.
- consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question.
- substrate independencesubstrate independence, n.: The idea that a mind depends only on the pattern of information processing, not on the material doing it, so a mind could in principle run on silicon as well as on neurons.
- functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior.
- substrate independencesubstrate independence, n.: The idea that a mind depends only on the pattern of information processing, not on the material doing it, so a mind could in principle run on silicon as well as on neurons.
Sources
- Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press.
Mentioned in
consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question., Chinese roomChinese room, n.: A thought experiment: a person who knows no Chinese follows a rulebook to answer Chinese messages so well that outsiders think they understand. If the person doesn't understand, does a computer running a program?, functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior., John SearleJohn Searle, prop. n.: An American philosopher who devised the Chinese room argument, which holds that a computer running a program can manipulate symbols without understanding anything., machine consciousnessmachine consciousness, n.: Whether a machine such as an AI system could have genuine experiences of its own — and the research field that tries to find out, or to build such a machine., mind–body problemmind–body problem, n.: The age-old question of how the mind — thoughts, feelings, experiences — relates to the physical body and brain. Is the mind simply what the brain does, or something more?, strong AIstrong AI, n.: Originally, the claim that a computer running the right program would literally have a mind and understand, not just imitate understanding. Today it often simply means AI as capable as humans across the board., digital minddigital mind, n.: A mind that exists as software running on computers — such as a sufficiently advanced AI or a digital copy of a human brain — especially when considering its moral and social standing., indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious., multiple realizabilitymultiple realizability, n.: The idea that the same mental state, such as pain, could be produced by very different physical systems — human brains, octopus brains or perhaps computers — just as one program can run on different machines., panpsychismpanpsychism, n.: The idea that some simple form of experience is a basic feature of all matter, so that minds like ours are built out of tiny glimmers of mind found everywhere., substrate independencesubstrate independence, n.: The idea that a mind depends only on the pattern of information processing, not on the material doing it, so a mind could in principle run on silicon as well as on neurons.