machine consciousness
In plain wordsWhether a machine such as an AI system could have genuine experiences of its own — and the research field that tries to find out, or to build such a machine.
Conscious experience, especially phenomenal consciousnessphenomenal consciousness, n.: The felt, experiential side of the mind — what it is like to taste coffee or to feel sad — as opposed to simply processing or reporting information., as it might exist in an artificial system; by extension, the interdisciplinary research that asks whether and how such experience could arise, how it could be detected and what would follow ethically. Approaches divide over theory — computational functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior. holds that the right computations suffice, while biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind. and integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness. hold that conventional digital hardware does not — and over evidence: many researchers consider behavior and self-reports weak evidence in language modelslarge language model, n.: A computer program trained on enormous amounts of text to predict the words that come next. At vast scale, that simple skill lets it chat, answer questions, translate, summarize and write code. trained to imitate human talk, and favor architectural indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious. and experimental studies of introspectionintrospection, n.: Looking inward to observe your own thoughts and feelings. For AI, the question is whether a model can accurately report what is actually happening inside it, rather than guessing or making it up.. Expert opinion on whether current or near-future systems could be conscious is widely divided. The stakes are ethical: a conscious AI might be a moral patientmoral patienthood, n.: Being the kind of being whose interests matter morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged. Babies and animals count, even though they are not responsible for what they do., the concern of AI welfareAI welfare, n.: Concern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it., while mistaken attributions risk misplaced attachment and manipulation.
The lab says it takes machine consciousness seriously enough to study it, without claiming its models are conscious.
Origin
Discussed since Alan Turing answered the 'argument from consciousness' in 1950. 'Artificial consciousness' and 'machine consciousness' named a research field by the 1990s and 2000s, through work by Igor Aleksander and others, the workshop 'Can a Machine Be Conscious?' at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory (May 2001) and, by the late 2000s, the International Journal of Machine Consciousness. Conversational language models made it a public question from 2022.
Usage note
Thomas Metzinger has argued for a moratorium on research that risks creating artificial suffering (2021). Others, including Mustafa Suleyman (August 2025), warn that the nearer danger is seemingly conscious AIseemingly conscious AI, n.: An AI that gives such a convincing impression of having feelings and a self that people believe it is conscious, whether or not it actually is. that convinces users it is conscious whatever the truth.
Related
- consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question.
- indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious.
- AI welfareAI welfare, n.: Concern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it.
- moral patienthoodmoral patienthood, n.: Being the kind of being whose interests matter morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged. Babies and animals count, even though they are not responsible for what they do.
- hard problem of consciousnesshard problem of consciousness, n.: The puzzle of why physical processes in a brain — or a computer — should feel like anything from the inside, rather than simply running without any inner experience.
- LaMDA sentience controversyLaMDA sentience controversy, n.: A 2022 episode in which a Google engineer claimed the company's chatbot LaMDA had become conscious and deserved rights. Google rejected the claim and later fired him for breaking its confidentiality rules, and the case set off worldwide debate.
- anthropomorphismanthropomorphism, n.: Treating something that isn't human — a pet, a car, a chatbot — as if it had human thoughts, feelings or intentions. AI that talks fluently makes this temptation unusually strong.
Sources
- Butlin, P., Long, R. et al. (2023). Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness. arXiv:2308.08708. arxiv.org/abs/2308.08708
- Metzinger, T. (2021). Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic Phenomenology. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 8(1), 43–66.
Mentioned in
AI welfareAI welfare, n.: Concern for the well-being of AI systems themselves, in case some of them can suffer or have interests that matter — and the research into how to tell and what to do about it., consciousnessconsciousness, n.: Having experiences: there being something it feels like to be you, as when you see red or feel pain. Whether any AI is or could become conscious is an open and fiercely debated question., computational theory of mindcomputational theory of mind, n.: The idea that thinking is a kind of computation: the mind processes information by following rules, much as a computer runs a program, and the brain is the machine doing it., David ChalmersDavid Chalmers, prop. n.: An Australian philosopher who named the 'hard problem' of consciousness — why physical processes feel like anything at all — and who asks whether AI systems could be conscious., functionalismfunctionalism, n.: The view that minds are defined by how they work, not what they are made of: pain, for example, is whatever inner state plays pain's part, linking injury, other thoughts and behavior., global workspace theoryglobal workspace theory, n.: A leading scientific theory holding that we become conscious of something when the brain broadcasts it widely — as if putting it on a stage where every part of the mind can use it., hard problem of consciousnesshard problem of consciousness, n.: The puzzle of why physical processes in a brain — or a computer — should feel like anything from the inside, rather than simply running without any inner experience., integrated information theoryintegrated information theory, n.: A scientific theory that measures consciousness by how much a system works as a single, unified whole rather than as separate parts. It implies that ordinary computers, whatever software they run, have little or no consciousness., introspectionintrospection, n.: Looking inward to observe your own thoughts and feelings. For AI, the question is whether a model can accurately report what is actually happening inside it, rather than guessing or making it up., phenomenal consciousnessphenomenal consciousness, n.: The felt, experiential side of the mind — what it is like to taste coffee or to feel sad — as opposed to simply processing or reporting information., philosophy of artificial intelligencephilosophy of artificial intelligence, n.: The branch of philosophy that asks what AI is and could be: whether machines can think, understand or be conscious, what intelligence is, and what we owe to and should expect from intelligent machines., problem of other mindsproblem of other minds, n.: The puzzle of how we can know that anyone besides ourselves has thoughts and feelings, since we only ever see their behavior. AI turns this old puzzle into a practical one., access consciousnessaccess consciousness, n.: Information in the mind that is available for use — for thinking, speaking and guiding behavior — whether or not any feeling comes with it., attention schema theoryattention schema theory, n.: A theory that the brain keeps a simplified sketch of its own attention, and that our feeling of having an inner awareness is simply how that sketch portrays attention., biological naturalismbiological naturalism, n.: John Searle's view that consciousness is a real biological product of brains, as digestion is of stomachs, so running a computer program would not by itself create a mind., Giulio TononiGiulio Tononi, prop. n.: An Italian-American neuroscientist who created integrated information theory, which measures consciousness by how unified a system's internal causes are, and which implies ordinary computers are not conscious., illusionismillusionism, n.: The view that the inner glow of experience that seems so hard to explain is a kind of trick the brain plays on itself: we are conscious, but not in the mysterious way it seems., indicator properties of consciousnessindicator properties of consciousness, n.: A checklist of design features that leading scientific theories link to consciousness, used to judge how likely it is that a particular AI system could be conscious., LaMDA sentience controversyLaMDA sentience controversy, n.: A 2022 episode in which a Google engineer claimed the company's chatbot LaMDA had become conscious and deserved rights. Google rejected the claim and later fired him for breaking its confidentiality rules, and the case set off worldwide debate., Lucas–Penrose argumentLucas–Penrose argument, n.: An argument that human minds cannot be computers because, using a famous result in logic, people can see that certain statements are true that no fixed computer program could prove., Ned BlockNed Block, prop. n.: An American philosopher who distinguished felt experience from information available for thinking, and who imagined a lookup-table machine to show that passing a conversation test need not mean intelligence., neural correlates of consciousnessneural correlates of consciousness, n.: The particular brain activity that reliably goes with a conscious experience — the minimum the brain must be doing for you to see, hear or feel something., Roger PenroseRoger Penrose, prop. n.: A British mathematical physicist and Nobel laureate who argues that human understanding is not computational, so that no computer, however powerful, could truly think like a mathematician., seemingly conscious AIseemingly conscious AI, n.: An AI that gives such a convincing impression of having feelings and a self that people believe it is conscious, whether or not it actually is.